Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 4

Article 2

5-15-2002

Remedying Past and Future Harm: Reconciling Conflicting Circuit
Court Decisions Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
Daniel H. Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel H. Lee Remedying Past and Future Harm: Reconciling Conflicting Circuit Court Decisions Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 29 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4 (2002)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Remedying Past and Future Harm:
Reconciling Conflicting Circuit
Court Decisions Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act

I.

INTRODUCTION

Pepperidge Farm produces popular cheese-flavored bite-sized crackers
in the shape of a goldfish.' The same goldfish acts as a trademark for
Pepperidge Farm.' Between 1995 and 1998, Pepperidge Farm spent more
than one hundred twenty million dollars on promoting its Goldfish

trademark nationwide.' Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey promote their
circus around the country through the use of their famous slogan, "The
Greatest Show on Earth."4 In 1996 alone, the company spent about nineteen
million dollars advertising and marketing this trademark to the public
Trademarks have taken on a more prominent role in today's market
economy. Consumers have come to rely more and more on trademarks as a
means of making an informed decision on what products they purchase.' In
the modem age of the Internet, customers do not even have to go to the
grocery store to purchase their goldfish crackers Thus, they have come to
1. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 213.
4. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999).
5. Id.
6. See generally JOHN M. MURPHY, BRAND STRATEGY 18 (1990).
7. See id.
8. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000). See
generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (describing the structure and functions of the
Internet); "[Tihe Internet is on its way becoming a familiar aspect in our daily lives ....
" Sporty's
Farm, 202 F.3d at 492.
Over the last few years, the commercial side of the Internet has grown rapidly. Web
pages are now used by companies to provide information about their products in a much
more detailed fashion than can be done through a standard advertisement. Moreover,
many consumers and businesses now order goods and services directly from company
web pages.
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rely on the trademark as a way of informing them about the products they
have purchased.9 In fact, trademarks have become "silent [salesmen] that
reach[] over the shoulder0 of the retailer and across the latter's counter,
straight to the consumer.'
Knowing this, companies such as Pepperidge Farm have invested
millions of dollars on creating and promoting their trademarks." For these
companies, investing anywhere between nineteen and forty million a year to
maintain the strength of their trademarks means that their trademarks have
become valuable marketing tools, as well as valuable assets. 2 Realizing the
incredible marketing power of a widely recognized trademark, smaller
companies have attempted to market their products by using trademarks
similar to the famous trademark. 3 Through the use of these trademark
imitations, smaller companies have accomplished consumer deception." By
using confusingly similar trademarks, they have confused the consumer into

Id. at 493.
9. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.
For consumers to buy things or gather information on the Internet, they need an easy way
to find particular companies or brand names. The most common method of locating an
unknown domain name is simply to type in the company name or logo with the suffix
.com.... As a result, companies strongly prefer that their domain name be comprised of
the company or brand trademark and the suffix .com.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Elizabeth Robison Martin, Note, "Too Famous to Live Long!" The
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Sets Its Sights to Eliminate Cybersquatting
Opportunistic Claims on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797 (2000); Gregory B. Blasbalg,
Comment, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways to Control Their
Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 563 (2000) (addressing cybersquatting).
10. Julius R. Lunsford, Trademark Basics, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 880 (1969); see also
Patricia Kimball Fletcher, Comment, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of a
Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302-03 (1982) ("The technological advances of the
industrial revolution, particularly in communication and transportation, caused the consumer and
manufacturer to become distant.... Trademarks thus became, and still remain, the symbols
bridging the gap between manufacturer and consumer.")
11. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that between
1995 and 1998, Pepperidge Farm spent more than 120 million dollars advertising and marketing its
Goldfish crackers natioliwide); see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that in 1996, Ringling Bros.
spent about $19 million advertising and marketing its slogan to the public).
12. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of TrademarkProtection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
830 (1927) (stating that companies have made "vast expenditures in advertising" to build their
trademark); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029
("The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and
the commercial value and the aura of the mark itself .... ").
13. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 824 (1997). "A producer must be wary of
trademark imitators. 'If an imitator can seize the bridge [stretching from producer to consumer
through public deception], he can collect the rich toll."' id. at 852 (quoting Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1187
(1948)).
14. Id. "So too does a [trademark imitator] who, while not directly diverting business away from
the [trademark owner], deceives the public into believing that the [trademark owner] sponsored or is
otherwise associated with the [imitator's] use." Id.
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buying an inferior product.'5 Traditionally, owners of famous trademarks
have been able to stave off potential trademark thieves under the6 legal theory
that their competitors were committing trademark infringement.
However, given the incredible monetary investment and the
informational value placed on trademarks, is it enough to protect trademark
owners from such unfair competition?'7 For instance, Pepperidge Farm can
sue under traditional trademark law against competitors who unlawfully
imitate their goldfish trademarks to sell crackers or their snacks.'8 But what
legal redress do they have against non-competitors who imitate their
trademark?'9 For instance, what if a drug company wanted to market its
goldfish-shaped children's vitamins by using a goldfish trademark?' If such
imitation was to continue unabated, is it possible that the countless
imitations might "dilute" the potency of the original trademark?
The concept that a non-competitor's use of a similar trademark dilutes
the strength of the trademark is an irresistible concept for owners of valuable
trademarks.2 However, how far can Pepperidge Farm take the dilution
concept in order to fend off non-competitors?"2
Despite these perplexing questions, during the past fifty years, various
states have enacted dilution legislation. 3 In the last fifty years, only about

15. Id. The trademark imitator "both misleads the public and holds the [trademark owner's]
reputation hostage; to the extent consumers are disappointed by the quality of the merchandise to
which the [trademark imitator] is affixed, they will graft that dissatisfaction onto the[trademark
owner]." Id. at 852-53 (citing Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The value of a trademark is in a sense a 'hostage' of consumers; if the seller disappoints the
consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark.")).
16. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 825 (arguing that protection against dilution should be
concerned with "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods").
17. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for a discussion on trademarks in the context of
unfair competition laws.
18. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). This traditional trademark law, provides
relief for any use of trademark that is likely "to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
the public on the source of the product. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
19. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 825 (arguing that the law will prevent the misuse only where
there is an actual confusion created by such misuse).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 ("Thus, for
example, the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable
under this legislation."); see also Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F. 3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that the plaintiff in this case, Pepperidge Farm owned the rights to the goldfish
trademark).
21. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 831 (stating that "the preservation of the uniqueness of a
trademark... constitute[s] the only rational basis for its protection").
22. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc. 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
dilution is a somewhat nebulous concept).
23. See Karyn K. Ablin & Anil Koshy, A Matter of Opinion: Deciphering Dilution Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 Miss. C. L. REV. 61, 68 (1999) (stating that states began

one-half of the states have enacted dilution laws.24 However, legislating this
doctrine has provided plenty of controversy in the courts. To add fuel to
the fire, the courts have received dilution laws with mixed reactions. 6 Some
courts have rejected dilution laws due to their extreme pro-big-business
disposition, other courts have welcomed dilution laws as a legitimate
protector of trademark dilution.27
To remedy this mixed bag of jurisprudence, in 1995, Congress stepped
in and created a federal cause of action for trademark dilution by enacting
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"). 6 Congress intended for this
remodeled federal law to provide certainty and uniformity in the area of
trademark dilution. 9 However, in the past few years, the circuit courts have
begun to split on a new issue.' The issue is whether the FTDA provides a
remedy for harm that has already occurred, or harm that is likely to occur in
the future?' In 1999, the battle lines were drawn between the Fourth and
Second Circuits. 2 Since then, other circuit courts have joined the battle and
have started to form alliances with either side?
This controversy is relatively new in the field of trademark dilution, and
specific to the FTDA. However, the current disagreement has brought to the
forefront a controversy that surrounded the birth of the dilution doctrine.34
This Comment examines the current controversy in light of the old one. Part
II of this Comment outlines the development of the dilution doctrine,
including early criticism of the dilution doctrine.35 Part III addresses the
jurisprudence of dilution legislation in the states and by Congress, and then
discusses the controversy surrounding the federal statute. 6 Part IV analyzes
the split among the circuit courts, focusing on the seminal decisions from the
enacting dilution statutes in 1947).
24. Id. (stating that by 1996, twenty-eight states had passed dilution statutes).
25. Id. at 69 (asserting that dilution statutes were received with hostility by the courts).
26. Klieger, supra note 13, at 811 ("Although courts expressed initial fascination with dilution
theory, intrigue quickly turned to hostility .... ").
27. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text for discussion on judicial reaction to state
dilution statutes.
28. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (1997).
29. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 (stating that the
purpose of the FTDA was to "bring uniformity and consistency to the protection of famous
[trademarks]....")
30. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
1999).
31. See supra note 30; see also infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 151-175 and accompanying text for discussion.
33. See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text for discussion.
34. See infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text for further discussion of the early controversy
surrounding the dilution doctrine. See generally Kathleen B. McCabe, Diluton-By-Blurring: A
Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1833-37
(2000) (outlining the debate among the proponents and critics of the dilution doctrine)..
35. See infra notes 40-91 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 92-150 and accompanying text.

692

[Vol. 29: 689, 2002]

Remedying Pastand FutureHarm
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Fourth and Second Circuits.37 Part V attempts to reconcile the split by taking
a critical look at the positions taken by both sides and suggesting a new
method of interpreting the FIDA.3 Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing
that the current controversy should be resolved by interpreting the FrDA to
remedy both past and future harm.39

II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DILUTION DOCTRINE

TraditionalTrademark Law and the Rising Importance of Trademarks

In the early 1900's, the dilution doctrine was a revolutionary concept
because it deviated from the traditional notions of trademark law."0 In 1927,
the intellectual property landscape was significantly altered by Professor
Schechter's introduction of the concept of dilution."
"As Professor
Schechter recognized, the idea of trademark dilution as a harm that must be
prevented was contrary to the then-prevailing understanding of both the
function of trademarks and the predominant justification for their
protection. 4 2 Under traditional notions of trademark law, the primary
purpose behind protecting trademarks was for the protection of the

consumer. 3
37. See infra notes 151-198 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 199-304 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 305-318 and accompanying text.
40. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1833-37; see also Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 66-67
(explaining the new role for trademarks); Schechter, supra note 12, at 824 (arguing that traditional
trademark law is "hampered by obsolete conceptions both as to the function of a trademark and as to
the need for its protection").
Congress first enacted federal trademark legislation in 1870, creating a federal trademark
registration scheme for [trademarks] used in local, interstate, and foreign trade. The
United States Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark
Cases, holding that Congress overstepped its Commerce Clause authority. Congress
adopted a second federal registration statute in 1881 that, unlike its predecessor, limited
registration to trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes....
The Trademark Act of 1905, Congress' third attempt at a federal registration scheme, did
reach [trademarks] used in interstate commerce and remained in force until the enactment
of the Lanham Act, the modem federal trademark statute, in 1946.
Klieger, supra note 13, at 798.
41. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 66.
42. Id. at 66-67.
43. Id.; see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § II 14(l)(a) (1997).
From the start, the touchstone of United States trademark law and the broader law of
unfair competition has been consumer confusion. The relevant inquiry in any trademark
infringement or unfair competition action has always been whether the defendant's
[trademark] (or, in the unfair competition context, defendant's "total selling 'image') is
likely to cause public deception. While deception today includes confusion as to source,
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According to traditional notions of trademark law, trademarks
themselves did not have the marketing value that they have today." Instead,
trademarks were merely symbols used by companies to represent their
products and services to consumers. 45 Thus, their usefulness existed in their
ability to represent to the consumer a particular product or service.46
Traditional trademark law attempted to preserve this "source-signaling
ability" of trademarks.41 More specifically, traditional trademark law sought
to protect trademarks against imitators who were "likely to confuse"
consumers into believing that they were purchasing a different product or
service from the one that they were actually receiving.48 The justification for
the law was that this practice of consumer deception, if continued unabated,
would lead to distrust of a trademark to signal to the consumer a specific
product or service.49

Historically, trademarks have served myriad functions." Traditionally,
they were symbols used by companies to identify their products and services

sponsorship, endorsement, affiliation, or association, the reach of consumer confusion
test has not always been as expansive. Through the first quarter of the twentieth century,
trademark infringement was actionable only between direct competitors in an industry.
Klieger, supra note 13, at 795-96.
44. See Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 65 (arguing that under the notions of traditional
trademark law "the public usefulness of trademarks lies entirely in the marks' ability to signal source
information to consumers, [thus] it is this ability-and only this ability-that must be protected); see
also Klieger, supra note 13, at 799. Trademark law "was concerned foremost not with the senior
user's lost profits or the junior user's unjust enrichment, but instead with the consumers who were
'duped into dealing with an imposter."' Id.
45. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1832 (stating that "[tihe use of a trademark as an identifying
mechanism removes the need for consumers to inspect the quality of the good or service at each and
every purchase .... ").
46. Id. at 1832 n.29 (citing Schechter, supra note 12, at 818 n.21). "The plastic cellophane
envelope that encloses most goods sold today performs the important function of protecting goods
from tampering or damage, but also prevents the consumer from personally inspecting the good for
quality." Id.
47. Klieger, supra note 13, at 800 ("Under the physical source theory of the 1905 [Trademark]
Act, '[t]rademarks were.., viewed as serving a single function: to represent to a consumer the
physical source or origin of the product with which [it] was used."')
48. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997) (prohibiting unauthorized use of trademarks that
are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the ... origin, sponsorship, or
approval of' trademark owner's product or service).
[T]rademark infringement laws... protect[ed] only against consumer source confusion.
No stronger trademark protection than the "likelihood of confusion" standard was
perceived to be necessary in order to achieve the trademark regime's purpose of ensuring
that consumers draw accurate conclusions regarding the nature of a product based on the
trademark it bears.
Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 66.
49. See id. at 65. "Such misuse would have its own miserable progeny-as misled consumers
purchased products from sources they would not ordinarily trust, those consumers would cease to
rely upon trademarks as a useful signal of source information. Eventually, a trademark's usefulness
as a signal to consumers would disappear altogether." Id.
50. A trademark is any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a
person, or which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the
principal register. U.S. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946); see also J. THOMAS
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to consumers. ' However, their functions have changed. 2 "Commercial
transactions, however, underwent a dramatic transformation by the early
twentieth century.
As face-to-face meetings between producers and
consumers became increasingly uncommon, trademarks assumed growing
importance as indicators of consistent, albeit anonymous, source and
quality." 3 Simply put, trademarks no longer identified a product but
"actually [sold] the goods.""4 Thus, as customers increasingly relied on
trademarks to be "silent salesmen," companies made substantial investments
in creating and promoting their trademarks." In fact, trademarks became
essential vehicles for creating "brand personas," serving both to identify a
product and advertise it at the same time."
B.

The Birth of the Dilution Doctrine

The concept of the dilution was first expounded by Professor Schechter
in his 1927 article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection. Professor

Schechter argued that the role of trademarks had changed. 8 The trademark

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 444 (2d ed. 1995).
Trademarks serve a number of important functions. First, they help to identify one
seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others. Second, they designate
the source from which all goods bearing the mark come or are controlled by a single
source. The traditional rule is that the buyer need not know or be able to identity (sic) the
name of the source. Third, trademarks serve a quality function, indicating that all goods
bearing the marks are of an equal level or quality. Fourth, they perform an advertising
function by promoting and assisting in sales.
Id.
51. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Klieger, supra note 13.
53. Id. at 796.
The development of mechanisms for scale production and cheap and efficient
transportation of goods during the Industrial Revolution spurred a remarkable
transformation of commercial transactions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Direct transactions between producers and consumers were replaced by
anonymous sales of goods through retailers or other middlemen, in which trademarks
played an increasingly important role. The assumptions upon which nineteenth century
trademark law were built did not match early twentieth century trade realities.
Id. at 799-800.
54. Schechter, supra note 12, at 819.
55. Id. at 830 (arguing that the vast expenditures made in advertising used to build a trademark
"should be protected to the same extent as plant and machinery"); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-374,
at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 (stating that one of the purposes of dilution law is
to protect the "substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and
aura of the mark itself').
56. Klieger, supra note 13, at 790.
57. See generally Schechter, supra note 12.
58. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 831 (arguing that the selling power of a trademark "depends
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had moved beyond acting merely as a symbol of a product-it now served as
"an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of good will."59 Thus,
Professor Schechter argued that it was time to preserve the true value of the
trademark in the modem market economy.'
To effectuate this new purpose, Professor Schechter proposed that
trademarks be given protection from a new danger called trademark
dilution.6' Professor Schechter stated that due to the "vast expenditures in

advertising" used to build trademarks, protection against dilution was
needed to protect the investment of the trademark owner."
This new rationale for protecting trademarks meant that traditional
trademark law needed to be expanded.63 Under the dilution doctrine, it did

not matter whether the trademark thief was a competitor or a nonInstead, he argued that trademark law should protect
competitor.'
trademarks against the dilution of the uniqueness of trademarks." This legal
theory was radical for its time because it shifted the focus away from the

for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is
used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity").
59. See id. at 818.
60. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 831 ("[P]reservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should
constitute the only rational basis for its protection."). As one commentator noted, in the "modern era
of sealed packages and shrink-wrap," the use of a trademark "removes the need for consumers to
inspect the quality of the good or services at each and every purchase." McCabe, supra note 34, at
1832 (stating that "[d]espite statutory advancements during the past century in protecting
trademarks, the nature of this protection continues to be embroiled in controversy, particularly in the
area of dilution claims.").
61. Id. at 832. Professor Schechter also argued that the purpose of trademark dilution law should
be to protect against the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods." Id. at 825.
62. Id. at 830 (arguing that the "vast expenditures in advertising" used to build a trademark
"should be protected to the same extent as plant and machinery").
63. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 67. "[Professor Schechter] argu[ed] that the idea that no
harm is done when there is no consumer confusion is 'an archaic notion' that 'ignores the fact that
the creation and retention of custom... is the primary purpose of the trademark today."' Id. at 67
n.43.
64. Id. at 67. "This new role for trademarks meant that protection against only a likelihood of
confusion was insufficient." Id.; see also Schechter, supra note 12, at 825 (noting that protection
against dilution should be concerned with "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods").
Seemingly ignorant of the changing function of trademarks in commercial transactions,
early twentieth century trademark law clung to the view that trademarks, and thus
consumers, only demanded protection when marks were used on directly competing
products.... Schechter went a step beyond source theory, however, and examined what
it really means to consumers that a product emanates from the same source as goods
purchased previously by the consumer that bore the same mark.
Klieger, supra note 13, at 802-03.
65. Testifying before a Congressional committee, Frank Schechter stated: "If you take Rolls
Royce-for instance, if you allow Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls
Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more."
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1932) (statement of Frank I.
Schechter), quoted in David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV.
531, 539 (1991).
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protection of the consumer to the protection of the trademark owner.' In
effect, this shift changed the landscape of trademark law.67 Now, trademark
law was no longer based on unfair competition and protecting the public
from deception, but rather on the property rights of trademark holders much
like those afforded in copyright and patent law.' However, Professor
Schechter maintained that such laws were necessary to preserve the true
value of trademarks in our modem economy. 69
C. Criticismof the Dilution Doctrine

This radical theory continues to be entangled in controversy."
Opponents of the dilution doctrine, known as "restrictionists," argue that
granting legal protection against trademark dilution amounts to a legislative
grant of a monopoly for big businesses." They argue that big businesses do
not need any more protection in the marketplace.72 They contend that

66.

FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-

150, 164-66, 171 (Faculty of Law of Colum. Univ. ed., 1925). "The owner of a trade-mark
who expends large sums of money in making his mark known to the public as a symbol and
guarantee of the excellence of the quality of his product should receive the same protection from the
courts for his investment ....
" Id. at 171.
67. Klieger, supra note 13, at 808.
In the two decades immediately following Schechter's dilution proposal, courts, and
eventually Congress, eliminated the direct competition requirement that had prevented
trademark law from matching trade realities. By the second half of the twentieth century,
few could question the degree to which the consumer confusion test protected the source
and quality identification functions of trademarks ....
Id.
68. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for discussion of trademark law versus
copyright and patent law.
69. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 68.
But Schechter believed that such protection was necessary to protect what was, in his
opinion, the true value of trademarks in the modem market economy. Moreover,
Professor Schechter envisioned a sliding-scale of protection in which "the degree of
protection depend[ed] in turn upon the extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of
its owner, [the mark was] actually unique and different from other marks." As a result,
"arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks or names should be given a much broader degree of
protection than symbols, words or phrases in common use."
Id.
70. Klieger, supra note 13, at 802 ("Until recently, Schechter's dilution proposal, unlike his
observations on the quality representation function of trademarks, remained on the periphery of
United States trademark law.").
71. Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protectionfor "Famous" Trademarks: AntiCompetitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property" Right?, 47 FLA. L. REv. 653 (1995) (describing the
restrictionist perspective).
72. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1834. "Despite the arguments of proponents of trademark
protection, the fear of monopoly exists even today, affecting courts' decisions in determining the
relief to be granted in any type of trademark claim." Id.
MARKS
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generally, big businesses own well-known and "dilutable" trademarks.73
They argue that because these companies already have the resources to fend
off competing trademarks, they don't need the added protection afforded
under the dilution doctrine." They contend that this type of unnecessary
protection would create large barriers to entry into the marketplace, which
would lead to decreased competition." However, they contend that the
ultimate harm was to the consumers, as the consumers will face diminished
choices in the market and unnaturally high prices. 6
Restrictionists base their argument on several different concepts. First,
they claim that unlike real property, copyright, and patents, trademarks are
not property rights in gross." Historically, trademark law has been based on
a tort theory of unfair competition." The legal justification originates from

73. Klieger, supra note 13, at 861-62.
Truly famous marks like "Coca-Cola" enjoy such extensive protection under the
consumer confusion test ....Broad protection of the [Coca-Cola] mark for purposes of
preventing consumer confusion enables The Coca-Cola Company to invest considerable
time and money in development of a brand persona, confident that the persona will be
incidentally protected by trademark law.
Id.
74. See id. at 862. "Dilution protection thus encourages companies to invest more than they
otherwise might in the creation of intangible associations that add no real value to the product and
that deride economic efficiency." Id.
75. Id. at 856. "Consumer reliance on trademarks as source and quality identifies can generate
strong consumer allegiances to products that prove difficult, and sometimes near impossible, for
future market entrants to break." Id. "Because a dilution cause of action grants more protection than
a standard infringement claim, courts traditionally feared that protection from dilution would reduce
market competition." McCabe, supra note 34, at 1834.
76. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 170 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting JEROME GILSON, 2 TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE §5.12[1][e] at 5-272
to 5-273) (1999), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1071 (2001).
Historically, the Lanham Act has attempted to balance the two competing goals of
protecting consumers and protecting a trademark owner's investment. The FTDA,
however, is concerned only with the latter: "It does not have those twin public policy
goals of the laws of trademark infringement[.] As a result there may be a kind of judicial
restraint about the new law. The perception may be that it does not carry any compelling
need to protect the public, and that it benefits only a coterie of American business elite,
not the general public.
Id.
77. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1834. "Trademarks are recognized only as quasi-property, with
limited rights and protections very different from those associated with full-blown property rights."
Id. "The Supreme Court recently hailed the right to exclude others as '[t]he hallmark of a protected
property interest."' Id. at 1834 n.50 (quoting College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd, 199 S.Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999)). "The Court further clarified that the right of
exclusion is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property."' Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
78. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution
Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 465 (1994). "Trademark law developed from
unfair competition; unfair competition developed from the tort of fraud and deceit." Id.
The Supreme Court has continuously held that the trademark right is "not in gross" and
not a copyright or a patent, but that any rights to trademarks are appurtenant to the related
business. The purpose is to exclude others from confusing usages, not to grant a
monopoly in the mark in gross. A federal dilution statute would distort these common
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the notion of fairness in commerce where a competitor is prohibited from
passing off his product as that of another.79 Moreover, trademarks have
enjoyed legal protection contingent upon their usefulness to the public. °
The rationale was that illegal imitation of trademarks ultimately deceived the
public and caused consumer confusion."'
However, dilution "shifts the focus away from consumer protection and
towards the protection of an owner's" actual property right in the
trademark. This right is similar to that afforded to copyright, patent, and
real property. "3 Copyright and patent laws seek to protect the investment
made in the intellectual property.'
In addition, restrictionists argue that trademarks are just another form of
advertisement, and as such they should not be given special protection over
other forms of advertisements. "5 The restrictionists contend that because
there are many forms of advertising available to a company, there is no need
to protect this one. "6 Using similar logic, restrictionists also contend that
dilution protection results in an unnecessary restraint on the free use of
language."
Overall, these arguments all lead to one place. Basically, the gravamen
of the complaint is that the dilution doctrine upsets the balance of the free
law tort origins of trademark beyond recognition.
Id. at 466-67.
79. Id. at 465. "English courts first used the term unfair competition in 1803, using the words
'passing off or 'palming off.' The justification of this tort was that one should not pass off one's
goods as those of another and thereby profit from the deception." Id.
80. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1835.
In contrast, a trademark property right is contingent on commercial use and maintenance
of the mark and the good or service it indicates. Specifically, property rights in
trademark are defined in light of protecting the public, and are largely limited to the right
to prevent customer confusion or dilution of a mark.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F.
Supp. 605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
83. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 363 (1924); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 96 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
84. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1836. "Accordingly, while the intellectual labor invested in
copyrights and patents is directly protected under the Constitution, trademark protection is rooted in
the Commerce Clause, which is predicated on guaranteeing a predictable and consistent source of
goods in commerce to the public." Id.
85. Id. at 1833 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the PublicInterest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1635 (1999)).
86. Id. (noting that the restrictionist point of view is that "marks [are] merely another form of
advertising, designed to entice customers to purchase a product or service they neither want nor
need, rather than an essential identification tool").
87. Id. at 1832 ("[F]ederal trademark protection results in a restraint on the free use of
language ...").

market in favor of big businesses. 8 Restrictionists argue that the dilution
doctrine prevents small and unrecognized companies from using any similar
words or symbols to market their products. 9 They essentially claim that the
dilution doctrine is monopolistic in nature.' This in turn will lead to a
suppression of competition, and will ultimately result in harm to the
consumer.9'
III.
A.

FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

Dilution Statutes in the States

Although the dilution doctrine met resistance along the way, it gained
popularity in state legislatures-leading some states to enact dilution laws. 92
Despite the initial interest by the states in enacting statutory protection
against trademark dilution, Congress was not quick to jump on the
bandwagon. 9' Starting in 1947 and up to 1996-the year Congress passed the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act-as many as twenty-eight states had enacted
their own dilution legislation.' Most of these statutes provided protection

88. Id. "[Restrictionists] warn that federal trademark protection results in a ... monopoly of
trade by big businesses .... " Id.
89. Id. "[Simall and unrecognized mark holders are prevented from using well-recognized terms
to describe their own goods or services." Id.
90. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

24:114 (4th ed. Dec. 1999).
[N]o anti-dilution law should be so interpreted and applied as to result in granting the
owner of a famous mark the right to exclude any and all uses of similar marks in all
product or service lines. Such a radical expansion of trademark exclusionary rights
would upset the delicate balance between free competition and fair competition.
Id.
91. Klieger, supra note 13, at 866 (warning that courts and legislatures should be aware of the
expansion of the dilution doctrine, for fear that it will upset the "historic balance between free and
fair competition" and undermine "market efficiency and consumer welfare").
92. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 68.
93. Id. "No federal dilution protection immediately resulted from Schechter's article." Id.
94. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 li(c) (West 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1- 451(b)
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (Michie 1996); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 1035/15 (West 1996);

IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.113 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I IOB, § 12 (West 1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.165 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 1997); MONT. CODE

ANN. § 30-13-334 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1995)

(repealed 1997); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107
(1994); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1124 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3915-1165 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West 1997). In addition,

Ohio recognized dilution as a grounds for injunctive relief as part of its common law. Ameritech,
Inc. v. Am. Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
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for trademarks if there was a "[1likelihood of injury to business reputation or
of dilution of the distinctive quality" of a trademark.""5 Judicial response to
these statutes were mixed, and some courts even received these statutes with
much hostility.'

At the center of controversy was the issue of the amount of

Echoing the
protection that should be afforded to trademarks."
restrictionists' views, some courts claimed that these statutes granted
trademark owners a monopoly in the marketplace."8 Other courts welcomed

the dilution doctrine as being a protector of the true value of trademarks."
The critical phrase, "likelihood of dilution" necessarily provided an
expansive reading of the dilution doctrine."0 Courts criticized this phrase as
being over protective of trademarks because this phrase implied that there
was some measurable future harm."' In addition, one commentator has
claimed that this language resulted from an unnecessary borrowing of the

"likelihood of confusion" standard from a traditional trademark infringement
claim, which has no place in a dilution analysis.' 2 As a result, the dilution
doctrine evolved over the years as a mixed bag of jurisprudence, creating a

95. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1997). "Each of the state antidilution
statutes contains identical or substantially similar language." Klieger, supra note 13, at 794 n. 19.
96. Id. at 811 (stating that "[a]lthough courts expressed initial fascination with dilution theory,
intrigue quickly turned to hostility").
97. See id. at 816 (stating that courts encountered difficulty in defining both the interest to be
protected and dilution).
98. Id. at 811 n.153 (quoting Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp.
1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ("Until [the California antidilution] statute is interpreted more
fully by a California court, we feel constrained not to give it overly broad application lest it swallow
up all competition in the claim of protection against trade name infringement.")).
99. E.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
the New York dilution law was enacted to protect "the selling power that a distinctive mark or name
with favorable associations has engendered for a product in the mind of the consuming public").
100. Klieger, supra note 13, at 816-17 ("Although the statutes spoke of a 'likelihood of dilution,'
courts were left without standards for determining when the 'whittling away' of a trademark's
selling power was likely to occur or even what types of marks were protected.").
101. Id.at817.
Less speculative than why courts disapproved of dilution theory is how they stymied its
application. Courts accomplished the evisceration of the dilution case of action by
reading a series of restrictive requirements into dilution law that did not appear on the
face of the antidilution statutes. Most strikingly, many courts found that dilution, despite
clear statutory language that it applied "notwithstanding ... the absence of confusion as
to the source of goods or services," required a finding of actual or likely confusion.
Id. (quoting Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965). Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d
540 (1st Cir. 1957), also held that way.
102. See Klieger, supra note 13, at 817. "Some dilution proponents blamed judicial difficulties in
interpreting the antidilution statutes on misdrafting." Id.

"patch-work system" of case law that existed in only about half of the
states. °3
B.

CongressionalMandateAgainst Trademark Dilution

In 1995, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") was enacted to
combat trademark dilution on a national level.'" The FTDA was created to
effectuate the following purposes: (1) to create a nationwide uniform scheme
of dilution protection for trademarks;' 5 and (2) to create a federal cause of
action to protect trademarks from unauthorized users that attempt to dilute
the distinctive quality of famous marks. °
In order to prevail under the FTDA, the plaintiff has to prove the
following four elements:
(1) that plaintiff's trademark must be famous;' 7
(2) that defendant must use plaintiff's trademark in commerce; '°8
(3) that defendant began using plaintiff's trademark after it became
famous;" and

103. See Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 68-70. "[Tjhe [judicial] decisions [based on state antidilution statutes] are suspect as either attempts to evade legislative mandates or as indications of
widespread confusion regarding the concept of dilution." Id. at 70.
104. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (1997).
105. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
[A] federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on a
nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt
system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit
trademark dilution. Further, court decisions have been inconsistent and some courts are
reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for violation of state law ....
Id. at 3-4.
106. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. Specifically, the
FTDA provides that the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled "to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). Specifically, the FTDA expressly states that:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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(4) that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark "causes dilution of the

distinctive quality" of plaintiff s trademark.' 0
If the plaintiff is successful in proving the above elements, then under
the FIDA, plaintiff will be entitled to an injunction against the defendant."'
However, in cases where the plaintiff can prove that the defendant willfully
diluted plaintiff's trademark, then the plaintiff will be entitled to receive
damages." 2 The defendant will have several defenses, as expressly set forth
in the FTDA: (1) "fair use" of a famous trademark by another person to
identify the good or service of the trademark;" 3 (2) noncommercial use of
the trademark;"' and (3) "[a]ll forms of news reporting and news
commentary. '
There are several key differences between the FTDA and state dilution
statutes that are worth noting at this point."6 First, the FTDA specifically
requires that a trademark be famous in order to qualify for protection." 7
Second, the FTDA omitted the "likelihood of dilution" standard." 8 Rather,
the FTDA states that defendants are enjoined from trademark imitations that
"cause[] dilution," suggesting that the plaintiff must prove actual harm rather
than the likelihood of harm."9 Lastly, the FTDA specifically defines dilution

110. Id. In addition, the FTDA defines the term, "dilution" as the "lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of-(l) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception." Id. § 1127
111. Id. § 1125(c)(1). "'The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against [the
defendant] .... " Id.
112. Id. § 1125(c)(2).
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled
only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 34 [15 U.S.C. § 1116] unless the person
against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the
owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies [which are damages] set
forth in sections 35(a) and 36 [15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), 1118], subject to the discretion of the
court and the principles of equity.
Id.
113. Id. § 1125(c)(4). "The following shall not be actionable under this section." Id. "Fair use of
a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark." § 1125(c)(4)(A).
114. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(B) ("Noncommercial use of a mark").
115. Id. § 1125(a)(4)(C).
116. Matthew S. Voss, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division
of Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 270
(2000).
117. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H).
118. Voss, supra note 116, at 270; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.

as the loss of the trademark's ability to "identify and distinguish goods or
services."' 2

Courts have interpreted the FTDA and found that there are three types
of dilution: (1) dilution by blurring; 2 (2) dilution by tarnishment;'22 and (3)
dilution by cybersquatting.'
However, courts have found difficulty in
applying these types of dilution theories to actual cases.124 Despite some
clarity in the courts as to what types of dilution Congress sought to protect,
there has also been confusion as to the temporal requirements of the
FTDA.'25 In the past few years, courts have begun to diverge on the issue of
whether the FTDA requires plaintiffs to demonstrate some calculable past
harm, or merely the possibility of future harm.

'

C. Confusion in the Courts
Despite Congressional iitent to provide uniformity and consistency to
the protection of trademarks, case law interpreting the FrDA has resulted in
another "patch-quilt system of protection" for trademark owners.' As in the

120. Voss, supra note 116, at 270; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
121. Mark R. Becker, Note, Streamlining the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Truly
Famous Marks, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1397 (2000). "The first type of dilution, dilution by
blurring," closely resembles the original concept of dilution envisioned by Professor Schechter. Id.
Blurring typically occurs when a secondary use of the trademark weakens the uniqueness of the
original trademark and its ability to identify the original product. Id.; see also Mead Data Ctr., Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
122. Hormel Foods Corp., v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996). "The sine
qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark will suffer negative associations through
defendant's use." Id. Courts have found tarnishment where the trademark diluter uses the original
trademark to sell products or "services of an obscene, drug-related, or pornographic nature." Becker,
supra note 121, at 1398.
123. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).
"Cybersquatting involves the registration as domain names of well-known trademarks by nontrademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the trademark owners" in bad faith. Id. at
493.
124. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1867.
Many courts still cannot distinguish between a [dilution] claim and an infringement
claim, despite the straightforward Congressional language in the FI'DA and the
increasing number of suits that include a separate claim for dilution. "Often ...courts
will view dilution and infringement as descriptions of the same phenomenon....
Dilution is not, however, a consequence of infringement.
Id.
125. Voss, supra note 116, at 270. "While the language of the [FTDA] provides substantial
guidance for determining the threshold requirements of fame and distinctiveness, it is silent as to
how a court should establish dilution." Id.
126. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 90-91. "Coming to terms with dilution under the [FTDA]
is understandably difficult. The definition of dilution under the [FTDA], in its comparative
minimalism, laid itself open to perverse interpretation." Id. at 90.
127. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 (stating that "[a]
federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis
and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system of protection, in that only
approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution."); see also infra notes 151-210
and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant case law.
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past, courts have been cautious in granting dilution protection to trademark
owners for fear that they are essentially granting a monopoly.'28 As one
commentator has pointed out, courts "will often employ legal gymnastics to
reject a dilution claim, imposing artificial limitations on the dilution
remedy."' 29 "As a result, the dilution doctrine has been distorted by the
courts in ways that defy or misconstrue its original purpose and
parameters."'3
Of the four elements, the first element of "fame," and the fourth element
of "causes dilution" have been critical in the analysis of a dilution claim.'
Unlike state legislatures, Congress went to great lengths to limit dilution
protection for only "famous" trademarks.'32 Specifically, Congress listed
eight non-exhaustive factors to help courts in determining whether a
trademark is famous.'33 However, due to the lack of clear guidance by
Congress, there is much confusion in the courts as to what constitutes a
famous trademark.'34
Some courts and commentators have even asserted that this prong is the

critical component of the FTDA because it restricts the expansive scope of
the dilution doctrine. 3
Commentators have argued that Congress'
"scrupulous attention" to the fame requirement ensures that only a tiny
fraction of all trademarks will qualify for dilution protection.'36 The success
128. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
"[d]ilution causes of action, much more so than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very
close to granting 'rights in gross' in a trademark."); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080-81 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th
Cir. 1999). "A trademark is not an omnibus property right or a monopoly on the use of the words in
the trademark." Id. "A trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, phrase or symbol.
Trade-marks are not monopolistic grants like patents and copyrights." Id. (citations omitted).
129. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1834.
130. Id.
131. This Comment will focus on the "causes dilution" prong rather than the "fame" prong for the
reasons stated in the text. For a full discussion of the "fame" prong, see generally Becker, supra
note 12 1.
132. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1998).
133. Id.; see infra note 107 for a list of the eight factor test.
134. See Becker, supra note 121, at 1408. As Becker points out, circuit courts have taken
inconsistent approaches to analyzing the "fame" element. Id.
135. See id. at 1395-96; see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating that "[wie view the famousness prong.., as reinstating the balance-by carefully
limiting the class of trademarks eligible for dilution protection .... "); see also I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that the FTDA extends only to "truly
prominent and renowned" trademarks) (citation omitted).
136. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 75 ("Congress' scrupulous attention to the fame
requirement and the rigor with which it intends that the requirement be enforced ensures that only a
tiny fraction of all trademarks will qualify for protection from dilution."); see also Becker, supra
note 121, at 1395-96 (asserting that the fame element "has become one of the courts' most effective
means of controlling the potential rights-in-gross problem of dilution theory").

of the famous prong in limiting the power of the FTDA is beyond the scope

of this Comment.' 7 Instead, for the reasons stated below, this Comment will
focus on the second hurdle of the FTDA-the "causes dilution" prong. '
Several commentators have suggested that this is actually the critical

component of the FTDA.' ' This is because depending on how the phrase
"causes dilution" is interpreted, the owner of a famous trademark might be
forced to prove that they have suffered past dilution.'4 ° This issue is critical
to a proper dilution analysis because it determines just how much protection
the owner of famous trademark will receive under the FTDA."' A broad
interpretation of the "causes dilution" test gives will make it easier for
plaintiffs to prove their case.'42 However, this "would effectively give
trademark owners property rights in gross, and thereby upset the careful
balance achieved in the existing system."'' 3 On the other hand, a restrictive
reading might leave the plaintiffs with no remedy at all.'" 4 This would
effectively defeat the purpose of the FTDA to protect owners of famous

trademarks from dilution.' 5
137. For a full discussion of success of the "fame" prong in limiting the power of the FTDA, see
generally Becker, supra note 121.
138. See infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (stating that the owner of a famous trademark is entitled to relief if
another person's use of the famous trademark "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark"); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 90, at 24:114 "The pros and cons of the dilution doctrine
have been extensively argued by many legal writers." Id. Suffice it to say that the issue of whether
the dilution idea is a good one is still controversial and remains to be definitely resolved. Id. One's
attitude depends in large upon how much protection one thinks a trademark deserves, given the goal
of free competition. Id. "Unless these state statutes and the [FTDA] are repealed or read into
obscurity by the courts, trademark law's historic balance between free and fair competition will
falter, undermining market efficiency and consumer welfare." Klieger, supra note 13, at 865-66.
140. See Voss, supra note 116, at 266 ("However, the language of the [FTDA], while providing
guidance for determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous to qualify for protection, is silent on
the issue of how to prove dilution."). Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (overruling the lower court on
the issue of the "causes dilution" test), with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d
Cir. 1999) (explicitly rejecting the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the "causes dilution" test).
141. Voss, supra note 116, at 266. "Because dilution offers such a potentially expansive
exclusionary right, determining precisely what a plaintiff must prove to establish dilution is vital to
maintaining the proper balance between fair competition and free competition." Id.
142. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456 (stating that an expansive reading of the FTDA would grant
the owner of famous mark a property right in gross, a right which is comparable to copyright and
patent law).
143. Voss, supra note 116, at 267; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 90, at 24:114.
[N]o anti-dilution law should be so interpreted and applied as to result in granting the
owner of a famous mark the right to exclude any and all uses of similar marks ....Such
a radical expansion of trademark exclusionary rights would upset the delicate balance
between free competition and fair competition.
Id.
144. Voss, supra note 116, at 267; see also Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224
(2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's "actual consummated" harm interpretation and holding
that the "causes dilution" test encompasses a remedy for future harm).
145. Id. "To read the statute [narrowly] would subject the [owner of a famous trademark] to
uncompensable injury. The statute could not be invoked until the injury had occurred. And because
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The battlelines have been drawn, and the battle is between big
businesses and small businesses.' 6 The big businesses, who usually own
famous trademarks favor the future harm standard because they want to
enjoin potential diluters before they incur any harm."7 Conversely, the small
businesses want courts to stick to the more stringent past harm standard
because it makes it more difficult more owners of famous trademarks to
enjoin them.' 8 Within the past two years, the circuits courts have split as to
which standard to apply.' 9 The growing divergence in interpretation of the
FTDA began two years ago between the Fourth and Second Circuit.'5 °
IV. SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

A.

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development.'

1. Facts
In Ringling Bros. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, plaintiff,

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. (hereinafter
"Ringling Bros.") sued defendant, Utah Division of Travel (hereinafter

the statute provides only for an injunction and no damages (absent willfulness), such injury would
never be compensated." Id. (citation omitted).
146. Voss, supra note 116, at 266.
147. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1833. Proponents of the expansion of the FTDA
[R]eason that "all that the plaintiff.., asks is the preservation of a valuable.., link
between him and his consumer, that has been created by his ingenuity and the merit of his
wares or services ....
" Moreover, because the trademark holder created value in the
mark and introduced it into commerce, she is adding to the free use of language, not
detracting from it. Thus, [big businesses] argue that trademarks in fact encourage
competition and trade by providing the public with the information it requires to make an
educated purchase.
Id. at 1833-34.
148. See Becker, supra note 121, at 1395. "Why would it be so problematic to bestow upon a
trademark holder a virtually exclusive right to the mark?" Id. at 1392. One reason is that "dilution
would become a 'rogue law that turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into an anticompetitive
weapon.'" Id. (quoting Courtney L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17
FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 111 (1998)).
149. See infra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
150. Compare Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4thCir. 1999), with Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 208.
151. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
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"UTD") alleging that defendant's use of the slogan "Greatest Snow on
Earth" diluted its trademark, "Greatest Show on Earth."'5
Since 1872, Ringling Bros. has offered and promoted their circus to the
public by using the slogan, "Greatest Show on Earth."'53 In 1996, Ringling
Bros. spent approximately nineteen million dollars in using its slogan to
advertise its trademark through various media such as magazines, radio,
television, videos, and billboards.'54 It is estimated that about seventy
million people each year are exposed to the "Greatest Show on Earth"
trademark.' In 1961,
Ringling Bros. received federal trademark registration
56
for its trademark.
As early as 1962, UTD, an agency of the state of Utah, began using its
slogan, "Greatest Snow on Earth," to promote winter tourism."7 Since then,
UTD has spent about 300,000 to 450,000 dollars per year advertising its
slogan, mainly on automobile license plates.'
Despite the protest by
Ringling Bros., UTD received federal registration of its trademark in 1997."9
2.

Fourth Circuit Decision

In analyzing Ringling Bros.'s dilution claim, the court set forth the
following elements as Ringling Bros.'s burden of proof: (1) that its
trademark was "famous"; (2) that UTD adopted its trademark after Ringling
Bros. had become famous; and (3) that UTD's trademark diluted Ringling
Bros.'s trademark by "blurring."'" In analyzing the first element, the court
made a cursory ruling on the first and second elements.'6 ' The court
specifically addressed the issue of whether UTD's trademark diluted
Ringling Bros.'s trademark by "blurring."'62 The court gave deference to the
district court's opinion that dilution by blurring occurs not merely because
consumers mistakenly confuse the two trademark, but because consumers
confuse the two trademarks and the goods that the trademarks are associated
with.' 3 Moving on, the court stated that this left the critical issue of whether

152. Id. at 451.
153. Id.
154. Id. ("Through joint promotions with retailers, Ringling [Bros.] obtains significant additional
exposure for its mark. Also because of its renown, the GREATEST SHOW mark receives
substantial free publicity.").
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (UTD's primary use of its trademark is its display on motor vehicle license plates, but it
has used its trademark in magazine advertisements.).
159. Id. at451-52.
160. Id. at 452.
161. Id. (stating that "[a]t trial, Ringling Bros. put on essentially undisputed evidence
demonstrating that its mark had achieved 'famous' status before UTD began use of its mark.").
162. Id.
163. Id.
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UTD's trademark had diluted Ringling Bros.'s famous trademark.'"
The bulk of the court's analysis involved defining what it meant to
"dilute" a trademark. 65' In interpreting the statutory language of the FTDA,
the court delved into the history and evolution of the dilution doctrine due to
the "sheer difficulty that courts have had in getting a firm handle on the
basic concept of 'dilution."1 66 But eventually, the court broke down the
plaintiff s burden of proof into three elements:
(1) a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior [trade]marks
to evoke an 'instinctive mental association' of the two by a relevant
universe of consumers which
(2) is the effective cause of
(3) an actual [harm to] the senior [trade]mark's selling power ..... 1
The court conceded that this was a "stringent application" of dilution
under the FTDA because it forced Ringling Bros. to prove that it suffered
actual economic harm, instead of proving that it was likely to suffer
economic harm in the future.' 8 The court arrived at this conclusion by
analyzing the definition of "dilution" given in the text of the FTDA.6 The
court reasoned that a broad interpretation of the meaning of dilution grants a
property-right-in-gross to the owner of the senior trademark, and that the
text of the FTDA required proof of actual harm already caused by use of a
junior trademark.'70

164. Id. The court specifically addressed the issue of whether UTD's trademark diluted Ringling
Bros.'s trademark by "blurring" it. Id. The court gave deference to the district court's opinion that
dilution by blurring occurs not merely because consumers mistakenly confuse the two trademark, but
because consumers confuse the two trademarks and the goods that the trademarks are associated
with. Id. at 453 (quoting Ringling Bros. Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 55 F. Supp. 605, 615-16 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
165. Id. at453-61.
166. Id. at 453-56. In embarking on the difficult task of defining dilution, the court admitted that
"more than thirty years after courts first began grappling with the interpretive problem. . . 'dilution
remains a somewhat nebulous concept."' Id. at 455 (quoting Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.
699 F.2d 621,625 (2d Cir. 1983)).
167. Id. at 458.
168. Id. at 458-59.
169. Id. at 458. The court quoted the FIDA, which defined dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." Id.
170. Id. at 459-60. The court opined that the textual definition of dilution can be interpreted as
follows: (1)that the FTDA intended to protect the "distinctiveness" of the word symbol, or (2) that
the FTDA allows the court to presume that the owner of the famous trademark has suffered

To bolster its position, the court primarily relied on the plain meaning
rule.'7 The court stated that the phrase "causes dilution" did not mean "mere
In addition, the court
threatened" dilution of the famous trademark.'
reasoned that taken in context of the entire statute, the word "capacity"
referred to the lessening of the "former capacity" of the famous trademark to
distinguish itself.'73 Thus, the court reasoned that the FTDA was intended to

protect past economic harm rather than future economic harm.' 4 Lastly, the
court reasoned that the FTDA was not intended to protect possible future
omitted the phrase "likelihood of
dilution because Congress deliberately
75
dilution" from the text of the FTDA.
B. Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands, Inc.'76

1. Facts
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., plaintiff, Pepperidge Farm, sued

defendant, Nabisco alleging that Nabisco's fish shaped crackers77 diluted its
goldfish-shaped cheese crackers, commonly known as Goldfish.'
Since 1962, Pepperidge Farm has produced small cheese crackers in the
shape of a Goldfish.7 7 Between
more than one hundred twenty
crackers.' 7 9 To date, Pepperidge
selling cheese cracker in America,

dollar sales.'

°

1995 and 1998, Pepperidge Farm spent
million dollars marketing its goldfish
Farm's Goldfish is the second largest
and ranks number one when measured in

Since 1962, Pepperidge Farm has obtained many trademark

economic harm due to the similarity of the senior and junior trademarks. Id. at 459. However, the
court rejected both of these interpretations. Id.
171. Id. at 460. "In short... the Act does not literally proscribe mere 'likelihood of
dilution .... ' Id. "If the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any
contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the
instrument, must be accepted." Id. at 461 n.6 (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889)).
172. Id. at 461. The court also argued that the text of the FTDA did not state "will" or "may"
cause, but instead merely stated "causes" dilution. Id.
173. Id. at 460. The court stated that the word, "capacity" was temporally neutral, but in context
of the FTDA, "it is plain that the 'capacity' spoken of is 'former capacity' and not future capacity.
Id.
174. Id. at460-61.
175. Id. at 461. "Finally and most telling, there is the fact that in the face of the obvious centrality
of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the interpretation and application of state antidilution statutes
for the fifty years of their existence, the federal Act does not so provide." Id.
176. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
177. Id. at 212. Pepperidge Farm also sued under New York's antidilution statute. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 213. During this period, net sales of Goldfish crackers more than doubled, to $200
million per year. Id.
180. Id.
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registrations for the use of its Goldfish trademark.'8'
In 1998, Nabisco planned to produce small fish-shaped crackers, similar
to Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish line.'82 Soon thereafter, upon learning of
Nabisco's plans, Pepperidge Farm sent a cease and desist letter to Nabisco,
demanding that Nabisco halt the production of its crackers.' 3 In 1999, both
parties sought legal action, with Pepperidge Farm seeking a preliminary
injunction against Nabisco under federal dilution law.'
2.

Second Circuit Decision

Just five months after the decision by the Fourth Circuit, on August 31,
1999, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's

Unlike the Fourth Circuit,' 6 the Second
interpretation of the FTDA.'
Circuit ruled that the plaintiff must prove five elements to succeed on a
dilution claim: (1) that the senior trademark must be famous; (2) that the
senior trademark must be distinctive; (3) that "the junior use must be a
commercial use in commerce"; (4) that the junior use must begin after the
senior trademark has become famous; and (5) that the junior trademark must
cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior trademark.' 7 Of these
five elements, the court engaged in a cursory analysis of the first, third, and
Like the
fourth elements, and ruled that Pepperidge Farm met them all.'
Fourth Circuit, the court undertook an extensive analysis of the fifth
element, by interpreting the statutory phrase, "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the [famous] mark."'89

181. Id. at 212.
182. Id. at 213.
183. Id.
184. Id. Nabisco initiated legal proceedings by filing a complaint seeking declaratory judgment
that it did not violate Pepperidge Farm's rights in the Goldfish line. Id. "Pepperidge Farm
counterclaimed that Nabisco's crackers constituted trademark infringement.., and dilution under"
both federal and New York state law. Id.
185. Id. at 223 ("We reject [defendant's] argument because we disagree with the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of the statute.").
186. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the FTDA to require a plaintiff to prove three elements).
187. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999).
188. Id. The court stated that it is undisputed that Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish is a famous
trademark. Id.In addition, the court stated that it was clear that Nabisco engaged in commercial use
of its trademark, and that it began after Pepperidge Farm's trademark became famous. Id.
189. Id. at 214. However, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit initially analyzed the
meaning of the term, "distinctiveness" because the court ruled that the plaintiff must prove an
independent element of "distinctiveness," separate from the element of "fame." Id. at 215.

More specifically, the Second Circuit turned to the interpretation of the
phrase, "causes dilution."'"
The court explicitly rejected the Fourth
Circuit's reading of this phrase and stated that the Fourth Circuit's reading
relied on "excessive literalism."' 9' Thus, the Second Circuit ruled that
plaintiffs need not show actual economic harm in order to receive protection
under the FTDA.'92

The court adopted a non-exhaustive ten-factor test to allow the owner of
a famous trademark to prove possible future harm.'93 The court admitted that

a simple reading of the statute lends support for holding that the plaintiff
must prove actual consummated economic harm.'94

However, the court

warned that this "defeat[s] the intent of the statute."'' 5 The court reasoned
that Congress provided an injunction as a remedy, and as such Congress

intended to prevent the harm before it occurred.'96 The court argued that

forcing both parties to wait until the harm had occurred would cause
"uncompensable injury" to the plaintiff and uncertainty for the defendant.' 7
Thus, the court concluded that injunctive relief should be granted to owners
of famous trademarks even before the dilution actually occurred.'99

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 217-22. The factors are:
(A) Distinctiveness;
(B) Similarity of the marks;
(C) Proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap;
(D) Interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, similarity of the junior
mark, and the proximity of the products;
(E) Shared consumers and geographic limitations;
(F) Sophistication of consumers;
(G) Actual confusion;
(H) Adjectival or referential quality of junior use;
(I) Harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user; and
(J) Effect of senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark.

Id.
194. Id. at 224. "We recognize that the language of the statute gives some support to this reading,
in that it uses the formulation, 'causes dilution,' rather than referring to 'likelihood of dilution."' Id.
(citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
195. Id. The court stated that the Ringling Bros. decision relied on "excessive literalism" to defeat
the intent of the FTDA. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. The court stated that under the actual harm standard, the owner of the famous trademark
had to wait until the harm had occurred. Id. However, since the statute only provides injunctive
relief, except in cases of willfulness, the owner of the famous trademark might not be able to recover
damages. Id. In addition, the court stated that limiting remedy to only those who have suffered past
harm is also "disastrously disadvantageous for the junior user." Id. This is because the senior user
"will be obligated to spend huge sums involved in a product launch without the ability to seek prior
judicial assurance that their mark will not be enjoined." Id.
198. Id. at 225.
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V.

RECONCILING THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

The split between the Second and Fourth Circuits illustrates the
importance placed on the proper interpretation of the "causes dilution" test.'99
Moreover, the sharp difference in interpretive methodology demonstrates the
fierce battle between those who favor the idea that famous trademarks
should be given protection from dilution and those who believe that the
FTDA grants excessive power to successful companies that own famous
This "David versus Goliath" battle has been fought in the
trademarks.'

trenches of the text of the FTDA.2 ' The central issue is whether the FTDA
requires the owner of a famous trademarks to prove past economic harm or
merely prove likelihood of future harm. °2
The Fourth Circuit concluded that trademark owners must adhere to the
stricter standard of establishing past economic harm.2 3 This may be an
impossibility for situations where a famous trademark has recently started to
become diluted.2 4 Nevertheless, other courts have begun to side with the
approach taken by the Fourth Circuit.2 3 Recently, the Fifth, Seventh and
199. Voss, supra note 116, at 267. "The Fourth and Second Circuit opinions represent opposite
approaches to solving the dilution dilemma." Id.
200. Id.
The Fourth Circuit, in [Ringling Bros.] adopted a highly restrictive test requiring a
plaintiff to show actual harm through proof of economic loss, thereby making it virtually
impossible to establish dilution in all but the most extreme case. The Second Circuit, on
the other hand, in [Nabisco] adopted an expansive multi-factor test incorporating
likelihood of confusion factors, which in practice merely serves as a fallback for plaintiffs
unable to meet a traditional likelihood of confusion test.
Id.
201. Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 62. "Congress did not break down the dilution analysis
into factors as it did for the fame requirement. Instead, it tersely and somewhat cryptically defined
dilution as the 'lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
Id.
I..' (quoting Federal Trademark
services, regardless of... competition ... [or] confusion .
Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997)).
202. Voss, supra note 116, at 267.
203. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999). "[W]e therefore interpret the [FTDA] ... as requiring for proof of
'dilution' .. . an actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power .. " Id. (emphasis added).
"This concededly is a stringent interpretation of 'dilution' under the federal Act. It confines the
federal dilution claim to a more narrow scope than that generally now accorded by courts to statelaw dilution claims." Id. at 458-59.
204. Id. at 460. "[However,] [i]mpossibility or near-impossibility of proving [actual harm] does
not support their judicial presumption." Id.
205. The following courts have favored the Fourth Circuit test:
Fifth Circuit: Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
Seventh Circuit: Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
Ninth Circuit: Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D.
Cal. 1999), aff'd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
However, it is unclear how the other circuits will come down at this time:

Ninth Circuits have adopted the Fourth Circuit's actual harm standard' 6
These courts have mainly relied on the plain meaning of the statute, and thus
have taken a "textualist approach.""2 7
The Second Circuit explicitly rejected this approach as "excessively
literal," and justified its holding by relying on the legislative history of the
FTDA. °8 The Third Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit's flexible future
harm standard. 2" These courts have taken a "realist approach" to allowing
businesses to recover against potential trademark diluters." '
A.

Textualist Approach
The "plain meaning rule" states that "[i]f the words convey a definite

meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts
of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument,
must be accepted .... ."' As the Fourth Circuit contended, the courts must
first look to the plain meaning of the FTDA, because a purely textual
interpretation of the FTDA carries the greatest interpretative weight. 22
First Circuit: I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting both the
actual harm standard and factor analysis).
Sixth Circuit: Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing to both
Ringling Bros. and Nabisco, but not recognizing the split), reh'g denied, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis
11052 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000).
Eleventh Circuit: Carnival Corp. v. Seaescape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1269 n.4
(S.D. Fla. 1999) ("There is a split between the Fourth and Second Circuits regarding whether proof
of actual economic harm is necessary to proves dilution ... [but] the Court need not address it as it
finds that the [trademark] is not famous.").
206. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670 ("As an issue of first impression in this Circuit, we
endorse the Fourth Circuit's holding that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm .... "); Syndicate
Sales, 192 F.3d at 633; Playboy, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. Plaintiff must show that the defendant has
caused actual economic harm to establish dilution. Id. (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459).
207. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460 ("We cannot accept [the future harm standard] as a matter of
the [FTDA's] plain meaning."); Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670 ("[W]e endorse the Fourth
Circuit's holding that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm since this standard best accords with
the plain meaning of the statute.").
208. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999). "In our view, however,
[the Fourth Circuit's actual harm standard] depends on excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the
statute." Id.
209. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001). "In Nabisco, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
articulated a more complete set of factors for dilution .... " Id. "Because we consider the dilution
analysis in Nabisco helpful, we apply it to facts found by the district court." Id.
210. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. "Notwithstanding the use of the present tense in 'causes dilution,'
it seems plausibly within Congress' meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an
injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs." Id. (emphasis added).
211. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 n.6 (quoting Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889)). "[W]e are not free to depart from that plain meaning .... " Id.
212. Voss, supra note 116, at 278. However, the Fourth Circuit did not delve into the legislative
history of the FTDA. See id. "While purely textual arguments undoubtedly carry the greatest
interpretive weight, legislative history plays a useful role in the interpretive process. The court in
Ringling [Bros.,] however, makes no attempt to reconcile its interpretation requiring actual harm and
proof of economic loss with the Dilution Act's legislative history." Id.
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Although the Second Circuit accused the Fourth Circuit of engaging in
"excessive literalism," as a commentator has noted, the Fourth Circuit did
not engage in an elaborate analysis of the plain meaning of the FTDA 2 3
Under the plain meaning rule, a court must accept the plain meaning of
the FTDA, so long as there is "no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other
However, as the realists have pointed out,
parts" of the FTDA.2 '
interpreting the statute to require proof of past economic harm rather than
possible future harm would lead to an absurd reading of the statute. 211 If the
plaintiff had to prove past economic harm, then essentially the plaintiff
could not invoke the FTDA until there has been some measure of economic
harm. 261 This could lead to disastrous results for companies such as Nabisco
and Ringling Bros. who spend millions of dollars every year protecting the
value of their trademarks. 7
In addition, under the textualist approach, companies may never be
unable to recover their economic loss."' This is because under the FTDA,
the primary remedy for the plaintiffs injury is an injunction."9 Textualist
argue that the plaintiff may be economically compensated because the
FTDA does provide for damages.2 "° However, it provides damages only in
rare cases where a trademark was diluted through willful action."' Thus, in

213. See id. at 276-77 (applying other interpretive corollaries of the plain meaning rule to the text
of the FTDA).
214. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 n.6 (quoting Lake County, 130 U.S. at 670).
215. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. "To read the statute as suggested by the Ringling [Bros.] opinion
would subject the senior user to uncompensable injury." Id. This reading means that the "statute
could not be invoked until the injury had occurred." Id.
216. Id.
217. Klieger, supra note 13, at 852.
By the early 1990's, the cost to a company of introducing a new consumer product had
grown to as much as $100 million, with the odds of success no greater than one in ten.
Trademarks serve as "a narrow bridge over which all the traffic powered by [product]
advertising must pass."
Id.
218. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. "[B]ecause the statute provides only for an injunction and no
damages (absent willfulness) ...such injury would never be compensated." Id.
219. Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) ("The
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as
the court deems reasonable, to an injunction .... ").
220. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999). "Unlike the statue antidilution statutes which provide only injunctive
relief, reflecting their sole focus on prevention of future harm, the federal Act provides that where
willful conduct is shown, both compensatory and restitutionary relief may be awarded-for
necessarily consummated economic harm." Id.
221. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2) (stating that "the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to
injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade
on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark"); see also Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
224 ("The Ringling [Bros.] reading is ... disastrously disadvantageous .... ).
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most cases of dilution, where there is an absence of willfulness, companies
such as Nabisco and Ringling Bros. will only be able to enjoin the defendant
and ultimately be left with an uncompensated economic injury.2
Another shortcoming of the textualist approach is that it requires
plaintiffs to take on the uncertain task of providing the court with proof of
economic harm. 23 The court in Ringling Bros. admitted that "[p]roof will be

difficult, because actual, consummated dilutive harm and its cause are

'
difficult concepts,"224
but the court suggested three general means of

available proof: (1) loss of revenue; (2) survey evidence; and (3) indirect
evidence through the use of contextual factors. 5 However, as the realists
pointed out, these methods of proof are "inappropriate" because they are
inaccurate, expensive, and prone to manipulation.226 Furthermore, in the

absence of significant legal resources, it would be nearly impossible for
companies to resort to these methods to show economic harm.2 27
There is another absurdity with the textualist approach. The position
taken by the textualists in Ringling Bros. worked because in Ringling Bros.,

222. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. "And, because the statute provides only for an injunction and no
damages (absent willfulness), such injury would never be compensated." Id. (citation omitted).
223. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460. However, the court cited specific reasons for the actual
harm standard. Id.
Nor can it be said (as perhaps it can with respect to proving mere "likelihood of dilution")
that even if it is the fact that actual economic harm caused by replicating junior use has
occurred, there is no way to prove those facts independently. Though proof of those
elements of the elusive dilution concept may tax the skills of advocacy, that results more
from their substantive uncertainty than from lack of available means of proof...
[T]here are means of proving them by normal evidentiary processes. Impossibility or
near-impossibility of proving them does not support their judicial presumption.
Id.
224. Id. at 464.
225. Id. at 465.
226. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24. The Second Circuit pointed to some of the practical problems
associated with the textualist approach. See id.
To require proof of actual loss of revenue seems inappropriate. If the famous senior mark
were being exploited with continually growing success, the senior user might never be
able to show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the junior use
diluted the distinctiveness of the senior. Even if diminished revenue could be shown, it
would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss was due to the
dilution of the mark .... If a junior user began to market Buick aspirin or Schlitz shellac,
we see no reason why the senior users could not rely on persuasive circumstantial
evidence of dilution of the distinctiveness of their marks without being obligated to show
lost revenue or engage in an expensive battle of surveys .... We see no reason why
[circumstantial evidence] should not be used to prove dilution.
Id.; see also World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999)
(rejecting plaintiff's dilution claim on the basis of improper survey evidence). For further discussion
on the use of survey evidence to prove dilution, see generally Patrick M. Bible, Defining and
Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to
Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295 (1999); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild
West: Measuring and Proving Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63
ALB. L. REV. 201 (1999).
227. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (arguing that proof of actual loss is expensive and timeconsuming).
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the defendant had been allegedly diluting plaintiffs trademark for about
thirty years.2 However, this was not the case in Nabisco where the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant even before the defendant began diluting
plaintiffs trademark." 9

In Nabisco, the plaintiff claimed that the use of

defendant's trademark might cause dilution.23 This meant that there was not
yet any economic harm to plaintiff trademark .21 However, if the plaintiff in
Nabisco had to follow the textualist approach, then the plaintiff would have
been required to do the impossible-to establish past economic harm where
there was none.232 Thus, the textualist approach leads to an absurd result
when it is taken away 33from the fact pattern of Ringling Bros. and tested in
cases such as Nabisco.2
Finally, the textualist approach undermines the essence of the dilution
doctrine.2 3" The textualist approach implies that the FTDA requires the

passage of time before there can be a remedy against dilution.235 As courts
and commentators have pointed out, requiring plaintiffs to stand by while

their trademarks are being diluted hurts the businesses which have made

228. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999). In Ringling Bros., defendant's junior trademark
had allegedly been diluting plaintiff's senior trademark for about thirty-four years. Id. This period
started from when defendant began using its trademark, which was about 1962, to when plaintiff
brought its suit, which was 1996. Id. at 451-52.
229. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213. In Nabisco, the plaintiff brought its lawsuit before the defendant
marketed its similar goldfish trademark. Id. "In mid-December 1998, executives at Pepperidge
Farm for the first time saw a sample of [defendant's trademark]. On December 21, Pepperidge Farm
wrote to Nabisco protesting the goldfish-shaped cracker and requesting that Nabisco cease and desist
use of that cracker in its product and marketing." Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. "Nabisco responded by filing a complaint against Pepperidge Farm seeking a declaratory
judgment that [its trademark] did not violate any of Pepperidge Farm's rights in the Goldfish." Id.
(citation omitted).
232. Id. at 223. The court in Nabisco stated that the Fourth Circuit's approach was an "arbitrary
and unwarranted limitation on the methods of proof." Id.
233. See id. at 224. In addition, the court in Nabisco pointed out the practical problems that the
junior user might face if the junior user had to adhere to the Fourth Circuit's ruling. Id.
If the statute is interpreted to mean that no adjudication can be made until the junior mark
has been launched and has caused actual dilution, businesses in Nabisco's position will
be unable to seek declaratory relief before going to market. They will be obligated to
spend the huge sums involved in a product launch ....
Id.
234. Welkowitz, supra note 65, at 584. "The real justification for the use of dilution is more the
protection of marks against misappropriation than against 'whittling away.'
Courts and
commentators, explicitly or implicitly, believe it to be unfair for a second user to gain any advantage
in the marketplace by using the first user's mark." Id.
235. Id. at 588. "Dilution is a theory that requires the passage of time and possible additional
users for the process to be complete." Id.
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significant investments in creating and promoting their trademarks.236 By

allowing diluters to more easily dilute a famous trademark, the trademark
owner will have less incentive to invest significantly in a trademark.237 The
incentive then would be to produce the lowest possible quality of

trademarks. 38 Ultimately, this would create a marketplace devoid of
trademarks that consumers can rely on.239 The effect of the textualist
approach is detrimental to consumers because they will no longer be able to
trust the trademark to signal a certain quality of product or service."
B. Realist Approach

In explicitly rejecting the textualist approach to the dilution problem, the
realists have relied on evidence other than the text of the FTDA to determine
the temporal requirement." The realists argue that the textualist approach
can lead to absurd results, especially when applied in cases such as

236. Klieger, supra note 13, at 855. "Without trademarks or legal protection of trademarks
against public deception, consumer search costs would be dramatically higher, the incentive for
quality production would disappear, and competitive markets would cease to function." Id.; see also
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (arguing that without dilution protection, companies will be obligated to
spend huge sums of money without the ability to seek judicial assurance).
237. McCabe, supra note 34, at 1834. "[Aldvocates argue that trademarks in fact encourage
competition and... incentivize companies to develop marks that are unique or arbitrary." Id.
238. Klieger, supra note 13, at 855. Klieger explained a world without incentives for businesses
to invest in trademarks. Id. "[T]rademarks do more than indicate consistent product quality to
consumers; as compared to a world without trademarks, they also heighten the level of quality that
consumers can expect." Id.
A world without trademarks would be very difficult to imagine. If everything came in a
plain brown wrapper, the incentive to try to make a better product than the competition
would be thrown into complete reverse. The incentive then would be to produce the
lowest possible quality, because the consumer would not be able to tell the difference and
thus would not be in a position to retaliate against any particular supplier by refusing to
buy his product in the future.
Id. (citing Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 528, 544 (1980)).
239. See id.
In other words, if a consumer is unable to quickly and easily identify unsatisfactory
products, producers have no incentive in the form of lost sales to improve product
quality. Consumers might still be able to rely on a consistent level of quality;
unfortunately, that level will, for all products, be the lowest level of quality imaginable.
Id.
240. See id. Through the use of a hypothetical, Klieger explained the detrimental effect of the
textualist approach on consumers. See id.
If, for example, a consumer bought a box of 'Lucky Charms' believing it was
manufactured by General Mills, but it was actually manufactured by the Barely Edible
Cereal Company, consumer dissatisfaction with the product would be visited upon
General Mills. General Mills would have no incentive to maintain a higher level of
quality than Barely Edible were such gross public deception not actionable.
Id.
241. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit stated
that "it seems plausibly within Congress's meaning to understand the [FTDA] as intending to
provide for an injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs." Id.
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Nabisco.242 Thus, they argue that it is necessary to look beyond the statute
and into the intent of Congress in aiding their understanding of the FTDA.243
Relying on the legislative history of the FTDA, the realists argue that
Congress did not intend for the plaintiff to provide proof of past economic
harm.2" They reason that if Congress intended to provide such an obstacle
for the plaintiff, then Congress would have provided for such a provision in

the text of the FTDA. 45 Thus, they contend that the absence of such a
provision implies that Congress did not intend for plaintiff to meet such a
high burden. 46 In addition, they argue that Congress contemplated that the
harm caused by dilution would occur in the future. 47 In the House Report,
Congress stated "dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will

inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.24 8 This language
suggests that Congress intended to protect the trademark holder before the
injury actually occurred. 9

242. Voss, supra note 116, at 276-77.
[Interpreting the [FrDA] to require actual harm created not only an uncompensable
injury, it makes it unlikely the holder of a famous mark could enjoin any diluting use
until substantial injury had already occurred. By inevitably leading to an substantial
uncompensated injury, the [textualists'] actual harm interpretation arguably creates an
absurdity.
Id.
243. Id. at 278 n.92 (quoting Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4
(1991).
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry
benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it ....
Our
precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history reaches
well into its past ....
We suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.
Id.
244. Id. at 278.
The legislative history is replete with discussion of the fame and distinctiveness barrier,
but nowhere in the legislative history of either the 1988 dilution bill, the Dilution Act, or
the Report of the Trade Mark Commission is it suggested that a plaintiff must
demonstrate.., the far more difficult showing of actual [past] harm.
Id. at 278-79. "[T]o ensure that the bill does not supplant the current protection of trademarks ...
the committee amended the legislation to place greater emphasis... a sufficient level of fame ... to
qualify for federal protection [from dilution] .... " S. REP. No. 100-515, at 41-42 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
245. Voss, supra note 116, at 279 "It seems strange that Congress would omit any mention of an
actual harm requirement in [the House Report for the FTDA] -a substantial additional hurdle-if one
was intended." Id.
246. See id.
247. Id. ("The 'loss' Congress sought to remedy was a loss in a mark's distinctiveness, not solely
its economic value."); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029.
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. S. REP. No. 100-515, 41-42 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577 (emphasis added).
The Senate Judiciary Report on the 1988 dilution bill envisioned that the FTDA would apply "'when
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However, as a commentator has indicated, the text of the FTDA
contradicts the realist approach."' First, unlike the state dilution statutes, the
FTDA expressly requires that a trademark be famous in order to qualify for
protection."' Furthermore, Congress went to great lengths to specify what
constitutes a famous trademark, listing eight non-exhaustive factors for
courts to consider in making this determination." 2 However, as the
commentator pointed out, Congress did not do the same with the "causes
dilution" element.5 3 In fact, Congress specifically omitted the "likelihood of
dilution" language that is commonly found in state dilution statutes. 54 This
specific omission by Congress directly undermines the position taken by the
realists.'
The realists claim that the textualist approach is simply unrealistic and
impractical." 6 As the Fourth Circuit admitted, requiring the owner of the
senior trademark to prove actual harm is an uncertain and near-impossible
task. 57 The realists argue that there are practical problems with providing
the court with evidence of past economic harm.2 8 Relying on practical
concerns, the realists reason that their flexible ten-factor test is more realistic
and practical for plaintiffs to use in establishing dilution.5 9
However, there are also problems applying the realists' flexible tenfactor test." Commentators have criticized the court's ten-factor future

the unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies
something unique' ... and [when] 'the distinctive quality of a mark could be materially reduced
during a period of rising sales."' Voss, supra note 116, at 279 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-515, 41-45
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577)).
250. Voss, supra note 116, at 270.
251. Id.; see also Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(I)(A)-(H)
(outlining the eight factor test for fame).
252. See id.
253. Id.; see also Voss, supra note 116, at 270 (stating the FTDA "simply proscribes the use
which 'causes dilution' suggesting that... the plaintiff must prove actual rather than likely harm.").
254. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(I)(A)-(H).
255. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999). "Finally and most telling, there is the fact that in the face of the
obvious centrality of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the interpretation and application of state
antidilution statutes for the fifty years of their existence, the federal Act does not so provide." Id.
256. See supra notes 212-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impracticality of the
textualist approach. See generally Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
257. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460 (stating that requiring plaintiffs to prove actual economic
harm may "tax the skills of advocacy"); see also Klieger, supra note 13, at 840 (stating that to
require proof of actual harm would erect "an impenetrable barrier to any federal dilution action").
258. See generally supra notes 214-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
impracticality of the textualist approach.
259. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C, 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3rd Cir.
2000). "In Nabisco... the Second Circuit articulated a more complete set of factors for dilution....
[W]e consider the dilution analysis in Nabisco helpful." Id.; see also supra note 193 and
accompanying text for a complete list of the ten-factor text.
260. Voss, supra note 116, at 280. "If Ringling relies too heavily on textualism, Nabisco goes too
far the other way-completely ignoring the significant differences between state anti-dilution statutes
and the [FTDA]." Id.
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harm test because it mistakenly
includes a trademark infringement factor for
"consumer confusion."26' In addition, courts have also noted that consumer
confusion has no place in a dilution analysis.262 In fact, the original purpose
of the dilution doctrine was to do away with a consumer confusion
analysis.'
As Professor Schechter proposed, the focus was on the dilution
of the uniqueness of the trademark regardless of whether the dilution caused
consumer confusion. 26 Commentators contend that the realists' ten-factor
test reduces the potency of the dilution claim and frustrates the original
purpose of the dilution doctrine. 6' "[B]y inserting confusion factors into

261. Id. at 281. Voss explained why the factor for consumer confusion should not be included in
a dilution analysis. Id.
The state of mind required for confusion and dilution are distinct and dissimilar. The
essence of dilution by blurring is a loss of distinctiveness as a unique identifier that
occurs when consumers realize the same mark is used for more than one product, and are
not confused as to source. If consumers are confused, blurring of the mark cannot occur
simply because in their minds the mark remains the sole identifier for the senior user's
product. This is in contrast to traditional trademark infringement, which requires
precisely the opposite: consumer confusion as to the source of the mark. Thus, it is
impossible for unauthorized use of a trademark to cause both confusion and dilution by
blurring in the mind of any one person.
Id.
262. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999). "In the infringement
and unfair competition scenario, where the less famous a trademark, the less chance that consumers
will be confused as to origin, a carefully-crafted balance exists between protecting a trademark and
permitting non-infringing uses." Id. (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th
Cir. 1979)). "In the dilution context, likelihood of confusion is irrelevant." Id. (citations omitted).
"If dilution protection were accorded to trademarks based only on a showing of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness, we would upset the balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks .... " Id.; see
also I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1998) ("[The] classical likelihood of
confusion analysis.., are not particularly relevant or helpful in resolving the issue of
dilution .... ").
263. See Schechter, supra note 12, at 821-23. Professor Schechter believed that trademarks
should be afforded protection even when there is no possibility of consumer confusion. See id.
264. Id. at 831. "[T]he preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark... constitute[s] the only
rational basis for its protection." Id.
265. Voss, supra note 116, at 282. "[T]he court's multi-factor test represents an improvement
over previous tests, but by inserting confusion factors into dilution it ultimately converts dilution
into a fallback provision for weak infringement claims, and unnecessarily lengthens what is already
an exhaustive multi-factor analysis." Id.; see also McCabe, supra note 34, at 1858-65.
One reason for [the use of the confusion factor] may be that the volumes of case law
examining consumer confusion make it easier for courts to analyze a dilution violation
under those standards. Courts find it difficult to ignore that precedent, even though the
standard is inapplicable in a dilution claim.
Id. at 1858.
More dangerously, to reinsert a confusion standard into a dilution claim causes dilution to
fall prey once again to doctrinal murkiness ....
Despite Congressional intent,
demonstrated by the clear language of the FTDA stating that dilution can be found absent
likelihood-of-confusion, the Second Circuit reintroduced a confusion element into the
dilution doctrine.

dilution it ultimately converts dilution into a fallback provision for weak
infringement claims ....In so doing, the court reduces the emphasis on the
key dilution inquires .... 266
Finally, the main criticism of the realist approach stems from its
willingness to grant a monopolistic right to the owner of a famous
trademark.267 By allowing owners of famous trademarks protection against
future harm, the realist approach will tip the balance in favor of granting
owners of famous trademarks a monopolistic right in trademarks.268 Overprotecting famous trademarks will stifle competition by creating a barrier to
entry for other trademarks.269 The realist approach allows the owner of a
famous trademark to exclude other similar trademarks fairly easily. 7° Thus,
smaller companies with unrecognized trademarks which may or may not
dilute the famous trademark will nevertheless be excluded from the

marketplace.27
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has criticized the realist approach as
creating an unnecessary presumption.2"2 The presumption is that the owners
of famous trademarks need protection in the marketplace from predatory
diluters."3 The presumption is predicated on the notion that the entry of the
Id. at 1864.
266. Voss, supra note 116, at 282.
Moreover, because plaintiffs are not required to prove confusion under the FTDA's
definition of dilution, the dilution standard necessarily has a lower burden of proof than
an infringement claim. Unfortunately, because of the on-going mischaracterization of the
dilution standard, as exemplified by Nabisco, such plaintiffs often are not afforded the
protections they deserve.
McCabe, supra note 34, at 1865-66.
267. Port, supra note 78, at 486-87. "Under dilution theory, the trademark holder not only
controls each expression of the mark, but also attempts to control the manner in which consumers or
other manufacturers perceive of the mark. In this matter, dilution theory attempts a monopolization
of the [trademark]." Id.
268. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 90, at § 24:114. "The balance between fair competition and free
competition must always be maintained and kept fine tuned for the economy to work at a reasonable
rate of efficiency and competitiveness." Id.
269. Klieger, supra note 13, at 856.
The same characteristics that make trademarks so vital to free competition also imbue
trademarks with the opposite power to stifle competition. Consumer reliance on
trademarks as source and quality identifiers can generate strong consumer allegiances to
products that prove difficult, and sometimes near impossible, for future market entrants to
break.
Id.; see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
270. See generally Klieger, supra note 13, at 856-57.
271. Id. at 650. "[A] study showed that in nineteen of the twenty-two product categories, the
leading brand in 1925 was still the leading brand in 1985. The link between persuasive advertising,
consumer allegiance, and trademarks... can serve as a barrier to entry more powerful even than a
patent or copyright." Id.
272. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999) ("In any event, there are enough reasons why replicating junior use of
a mark might not cause any actual economic harm to a senior mark that it is not a proper subject for
judicial presumption.").
273. Id. (stating that "economic harm inevitably will result from any replicating junior use is by
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lesser-known and similar trademark into the marketplace will eventually
dilute the strength of the trademark to the point where the trademark will no
longer be unique. 7' However, owners of famous trademarks already have
the upperhand in the marketplace.2" Thus, these companies already have the
resources to fend off competition and do not need the protection afforded to
them by the realist approach." Ultimately, this hurts not only the smaller
companies but also the consumer.7
Stifling competition in trademarks
means that consumers will not benefit from the innovation and progress that
accompany free competition. 8
C. Toward a New Interpretationof the FTDA

In defense of its position, the Fourth Circuit stated: "Finally and most
telling, there is the fact that in the face of the obvious centrality of

'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the interpretation and application of
state antidilution statutes for the fifty years of their existence, the [FTDA]
does not so provide."2 '9 As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, in interpreting the
FTDA, it is critical to note that Congress did not include the "likelihood of
dilution" standard found in the state dilution statutes.8
However, this
omission can be understood in light of the "acquired legal meaning" of
dilution, and the function of the dilution doctrine.28 '
First, it is possible to interpret the term "dilution" and give it its
"acquired legal meaning."2"2 The tension between the textualists and realists
no means that certain").
274. Id.
275. See Planet Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826 (N.D. Ill.
1999). "As a nation, we long have extolled the virtues of free and vigorous competition ....
[However,] we hold no less dear the right of individuals and corporations to control and use their
own property, including intellectual property such as trademarks." Id.
276. Voss, supra note 116, at 266. "[The realist approach] would effectively give trademark
owners property rights in gross, and thereby upset the careful balance achieved in the existing
system where similar marks can coexist on noncompeting products." Id. at 267
277. Klieger, supra note 13, at 861. "[The realist approach] expressly reorients trademark law
around the protection of the persuasive function of trademarks [to the consumer] and, in so doing,
upsets trademark law's historic balance between free and fair competition." Id.
278. Id. at 862.
279. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).
280. Cf CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1997). "Each of the state antidilution
statutes contains identical or substantially similar language." Klieger, supra note 13, at 794 n.19.
281. See Voss, supra note 116, at 277 n.87 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329
(1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or
the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.")).
282. Id. at 277 ("[Wjords which have acquired specific legal meaning should be given that

stem from their extreme approaches to interpreting the FTDA. 83 The
textualist approach requires a strict showing of past harm, while the realist
approach allows a more flexible showing of future harm." However, the
reality is that prior to the enactment of the FTDA, state courts have

permitted the use of both approaches. 5 In cases such as Ringling Bros.,
where the dilution had been occurring for some time, courts have permitted

the use of evidence of past harm. 6 Conversely, in cases such as Nabisco,
where dilution was imminent, courts have permitted a showing of future
harm."' Thus, since the inception of the dilution doctrine, "dilution" has
acquired a legal meaning consistent with the two approaches taken by the
textualists and realists. 88

In addition, the policy goals behind the dilution doctrine support
granting dilution protection in cases where dilution is likely to occur in the
future. 9 As originally theorized by Professor Schechter, the dilution
doctrine was aimed directly at protecting the investment that the trademark
owner made in the trademark."l This is a "slow, gradual type of harm" that
should be granted protection under dilution law.29 ' Congress used this
rationale in the House Report to justify enacting the FTDA 2" The House
Report stated that "[t]he concept of dilution recognizes the substantial
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and
aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate

meaning unless the statute otherwise dictates.").
283. Id. at 288 (stating that "[t]he approaches taken by [the textualists and realists] represent
opposite extremes to solving the problem of how to permit plaintiffs to establish dilution").
284. See supra notes 211-78 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the debate between
the two approaches.
285. See generally Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23.
286. See id. (stating that some "courts implied conditions to a finding of dilution [to past harm
which was] expressly prohibited by the text of the statutes").
287. Voss, supra note 116, at 277. "The vast majority of such states used very similar language to
describe anti-dilution protection that guarded against the 'likelihood of injury to... trademark.'
Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 68-69 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1999)).
288. See Klieger, supra note 13, at 817. "Most strikingly, many courts found that dilution, despite
clear statutory language that it applied 'notwithstanding ... the absence of confusion as to the source
of goods or services,' required a finding of actual or likely confusion." Id. (quoting Cue Publishing
Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct), aff'd, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377
(N.Y App. Div. 1965)).
289. Schechter, supra note 12, at 818. Professor Schechter argued that the dilution doctrine
should protect the true functions of trademarks, which were "to identify a product as satisfactory and
thereby.., stimulate further purchases by the consuming public." Id.
290. See id. at 830 (stating that the "vast expenditures in advertising" of trademarks must be
protected).
291. Voss, supra note 116, at 277; see also Schechter, supra note 12, at 825 (stating that dilution
is the "gradual whittling away... of the identity.... of the mark").
292. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. "Confusion
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably
destroy the advertising value of the mark." Id. (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335
F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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the mark for their own gain. ' Itseems that Congress advocated protection
for famous trademarks from those who would, in the future, hurt the
significant investment that the owner of the trademark had made.294
This justifies the position that realists have taken. 95 Congress sought to
protect the value of the trademark from the danger of future dilution. 96
However, this does not mean that Congress sought to protect trademarks
from future dilution alone.'97 In fact, Congress sought to grant relief for
trademarks that have already been diluted. 9" In light of the original
understanding of the dilution doctrine, the goal of dilution law was to protect
the investment in trademarks.' This policy goal was adopted by Congress
and expressed in its House Report."m However, the intent of Congress in
enacting the FTDA shows that dilution law sought to protect the investment
that the owner of the trademark "has made" in the trademark.3 ' Thus, it
follows that Congress sought to protect the trademark owner from both past

and future harm.3"
Despite the seemingly opposing views taken by textualists and realists,
it seems that both approaches can be reconciled and used together to show
the true meaning of dilution." 3 The two approaches can be reconciled and
ultimately point to a new interpretation of the FTDA favoring the coexistence of a remedy for both past and future harm."m

293. Id.
294. Id. ("Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox
confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by another's
use. This is the essence of dilution.").
295. Voss, supra note 116, at 270; see also Klieger, supra note 13, at 860-62.
296. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029; see also S. REP.
No. 100-515, at 41-42 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
297. Id.; see also Schechter, supra note 12, at 831 (arguing for the protection of the uniqueness of
trademarks from past and future dilution).
298. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (stating that the FTDA will "protect famous marks from
unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of such marks
and, thereby, dilute their distinctive quality").
299. Id. (stating that the FTDA "is intended to protect famous marks where the subsequent,
unauthorized commercial use of such marks by others dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark").
300. Id.
301. Id. (stating that the aim of dilution law is to protect the commercial investment that the
owner of the trademark has made).
302. Voss, supra note 116, at 288 (noting that "[a] fair reading of the Dilution Act provides a
remedy for both actual and potential future harm").
303. See id.
304. Id.; see also Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 90. "Coming to terms with dilution under the
Dilution Act is understandably difficult. The definition of dilution under the Act, in its comparative
minimalism, laid itself open to perverse interpretation. Exercise of this potential misinterpretation
was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion." Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Ironically, the FTDA has caused more confusion than resolution."
When Congress enacted the FTDA, it sought to provide more predictable
results for the trademark owner."° However, just five years after Congress
enacted the FFDA, trademark owners still face uncertainty in the area of
trademark dilution.0 7 As demonstrated by the recent split in the circuit
courts, the cases give little guidance to trademark owners.08 Congress
enacted the FTDA to combat forum-shopping and decrease the amount of
litigation in overcrowded courts.3" However, the recent split in the circuits
means that forum-shopping will continue.3 ' Potential diluters threatened by
liability will likely seek declaratory judgment against owners of famous
trademarks in the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. ' There,
potential diluters will likely prevail against owners of famous trademarks
unless the owners of famous trademarks can meet the rigorous actual harm
standard.3 2 Conversely, owners of famous trademarks will proceed on a
dilution claim in the Second and Third Circuits, where they will benefit from
the flexible ten-factor test.' Furthermore, another potential impact of the
inconsistent decisions in the circuit courts is that, overall, owners of famous
trademarks will file fewer claims under the FTDA.3' Instead, these owners
will file more claims in state courts using state dilution statutes." 5 There,
owners of famous trademarks will seek to benefit from the less stringent
"likelihood of dilution" standard to prove cases of future dilution." 6
305. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (stating that the purpose of the FTDA was to "bring uniformity
and consistency to the protection of famous marks").
306. Id. (stating that "[p]resently, the nature and extent of the remedies against trademark dilution
varies from state to state and, therefore can provide unpredictable and inadequate results for the
trademark owner").
307. See Ablin & Koshy, supra note 23, at 61. "Today ... judicial construction of the [FTDA] is
strangling the hope for a single, national standard of dilution. As cases applying the Dilution Act
wind their way through the federal judicial system, courts have interpreted the Act in dramatically
disparate ways." Id.
308. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 90, at § 24:114 (stating that "[tihe cases give little guidance, and
plaintiffs are continually pressing for more and more protection").
309. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4.
310. Ethan Horwitz & Kandis M. Kahn, Recent Developments in Federal Trademark Dilution
Law and Their Potential Effect on Litigation Strategy, METRO. CORP. COUNCIL, Dec. 1999, at 18,
available at WL, 12/99 Metro. Corp. Couns. 18, (col. 1).
311. Id. "This uncertainty will no doubt produce the adverse effect of forum shopping ... ." Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. (stating that "[t]rademark owners and their counsel must therefore give careful thought to
the application of creative, flexible circumstantial evidence factors under Nabisco .... ").
314. Andrew L. Deutsch, Ruling Creates a Split in Dilution Jurisprudence:Rather Than Waiting
for the Supreme Court, Owners May Ask Congressfor Assistance, THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at
C22, available at WL, 10/25/99 Nat'l L.J. C22, (col. 1) (stating that the "FTDA has become an
unreliable remedy from the standpoint of trademark owners").
315. Id.
316. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of dilution standards in the
states.
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Today, trademark owners face uncertainty when faced with a claim
under the FTDA.3 7 Thus, ultimately, either the Supreme Court will have to
resolve this split or Congress will have to amend the FTDA.3" In doing so,
either the Court or Congress must be mindful of both the text and the history
of the FTDA. This Comment advocates the position that in order to give full
deference to the accepted jurisprudence of the dilution doctrine, the Court or
Congress must extend full protection to owners of famous trademarks for
both past and future harm from trademark dilution.
Daniel H. Lee..9

317. See Deutsch, supra note 314.
318. Id. (stating that "[r]ather than wait for the Supreme Court to decide between the two
standards for dilution injunctions, trademark owners are likely to ask Congress to amend the
FTDA").
319. J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, 2001.

